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PRISONER ACCESS TO PAROLE FILES: A DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in 1876 at the Elmira Reformatory in New York,'
parole 2 has become an integral part of the penalogical system. 3 The impor-
tance of the parole system has grown to the point where today, more often
than not, the parole board, rather than the sentencing judge, decides how long
a prisoner will remain incarcerated. 4 Yet, despite their enormous power,
parole boards have typically been afforded broad discretion in determining
who is to be granted parole.5 Because there is neither a constitutional 6 nor
statutory 7 right to be granted parole, courts have been reluctant to examine
1. H. Abadinsky, Probation and Parole: Theory and Practice 143 (1977).
2. Parole is the conditional release of a prisoner from a penal institution after he has served
part of his sentence. The release is premised upon the belief that a prisoner is able to return to
society as a useful citizen. L. Carney, Probation and Parole: Legal and Social Dimensions 154-55
(1977). For an excellent overview of the parole system, see Comment, The Parole System, 120 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 282 (1971).
Parole should not be confused with probation, which allows the individual to remain free
without serving any time in prison. See D. Dressier, Practice and Theory of Probation and Parole
16 (2d ed. 1969). Pardon differs from both parole and probation in that the individual is relieved
from the legal consequences of the crime he has committed. See S. Rubin, The Law of Criminal
Correction 665 (2d ed. 1973).
3. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) (citing Note, Parole Revocation in the
Federal System, 56 Geo. L.J. 705 (1968)).
4. "Parole is the predominant mode of release for prison inmates today, and it is likely to
become even more so." L. Carney, supra note 2, at 58-59 (quoting National Advisory Comm'n on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Task Force Report: Corrections 389 (1973)) [hereinafter
cited as Corrections]; accord, The Official Report of the New York State Special Commission on
Attica 94 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Attica Report]. In 1970, more than 70% of the prisoners
discharged from penal institutions were released on parole. L. Carney, supra note 2, at 58.
5. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 405 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023
(1971). See also Boddie v. Weakley, 356 F.2d 242, 243 (4th Cir. 1966); Brown v. Kearney, 355
F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam).
6. See, e.g., DiMarco v. Greene, 385 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1967); Carson v. Executive Director
Dep't of Parole, 292 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1961) (per curiam); Simon v. United States, 269 F. Supp.
738 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 397 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1968).
7. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Clark, 446 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
929 (1971); Barnes v. United States, 445 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). Although there is
no statutory right to be granted parole, in many jurisdictions a prisoner has a statutory right to be
considered for parole after serving a specified portion of his sentence. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §
31-411 (Supp. 1977-1978); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2807 (1977); Cal. Penal Code § 3041 (West Supp.
1978); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 947.16(1) (West Supp. 1978); Idaho Code § 20-223 (Supp. 1978); Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 38, § 1003-3-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); Iowa Code Ann. § 906.5 (West Special
Pamphlet 1978); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:574.4 (West Supp. 1978); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 127, §
133A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1972 & Supp. 1978); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 791.235 (1968); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 83-1, 110 (1976); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651:45 (1974 & Supp. 1977); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 30:4-123.10 (West 1964); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-17-24 (1972); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-58
(Supp. 1977); N.Y. Correc. Law § 212 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978); N.D. Cent. Code § 12-59-05
(1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2967.13 (Page 1975); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, § 3327 (West 1969); Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 61, § 316 (Purdon 1964); R.I. Gen. Laws § 13-8-9 (1970); S.C. Code § 24-21-620
(1976); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 23-60-6, -8 to -10 (1967 & Supp. 1977); Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-3612 (1977); Tex. Crim. Pro. Code Ann. tit. 42, § 12C(e) (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1977); Vt.
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the often chaotic administration of parole, despite prisoners' claims that the
procedures adopted by parole boards often lead to arbitrary and capricious
decisions denying parole.8
At the center of this controversy is the parole release hearing-the linchpin
of the parole system.9 A parole release hearing is an interview between a
prisoner and representatives of the parole board, after which the board
decides whether the prisoner should be granted parole. 10 A procedural issue of
crucial interest to both the prisoner and the parole board is the right of a
prisoner to review his parole file prior to his scheduled hearing." The
prisoner's interest in seeking access to his file is to ensure that the parole board
does not base its decision on false or misleading information contained in the
file.' 2 Parole boards, however, object to prisoner access because of the
administrative burden it imposes.' 3
In accord with the general judicial reluctance to interfere with the parole
system, the courts have also rejected the requests of prisoners seeking access
to their files prior to parole release hearings. A threshold issue is whether the
Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 1051 (1970); Va. Code § 53-251 (1974); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.99.110
(1975); W. Va. Code § 62-12-13 (1977); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 57.06 (West Supp. 1978-1979).
In other jurisdictions, however, when an individual will be considered for parole is at the
discretion of the board itself. See Ala. Code § 15-22-15 (1975); Alaska Stat. § 33.15.060 (1977);
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-1-204 (1976); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-125 (West Supp. 1978); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 11, § 4346 (1974); D.C. Code Encyci. § 24-204 (West 1967); Ga. Code Ann. § 77-515
(1973); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 353-68 (1976); Ind. Code Ann. § 11-1-1-9.1 (Burns Supp. 1978); Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 439.340 (Supp. 1976); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 34, § 1552 (1978); Md. Ann. Code art.
41, § 110(1978); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 243.05 (West Supp. 1977); Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-17 (Supp.
1978); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 95-3214 (1970); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 213.120 (1977); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 144.050 (1977); Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-9 (1953); Wyo. Stat. § 7-325 (Supp. 1975).
8. S. Rubin, supra note 2, at 628-29.
9. See pt. I infra.
10. Note, The Applicability of Due Process and State Freedom of Information Acts to Parole
Release Hearings, 27 Syracuse L. Rev. 1011 n.6 (1976).
11. This is of significance only to prisoners in state institutions. In Cooley v. Sigler, 381 F.
Supp. 441 (D. Minn. 1974), the court held that a federal prisoner must be given access to his
parole files because it "would greatly reduce the presently excessive danger of erroneous factual
basis for [parole] decisions". Id. at 443 (citation omitted). Subsequently, procedures permitting
federal prisoners to inspect their files were adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976). See note 90 infra.
12. See, e.g., Kohlman v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Conn. 1974) (parole denied because
file erroneously indicated that applicant had used gun in committing robbery); Leonard v.
Mississippi Probation & Parole Bd., 373 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Miss. 1974), rev'd, 509 F.2d 820 (Sth
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 998 (1975) (prisoner denied parole on the basis of illegal discplinary
action); Masiello v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Conn. 1973) (presentence report in parole file
contained unsubstantiated assertion that defendant would become connected with organized
crime if released on parole); State v. Pohlabel, 61 N.J. Super. 242, 160 A.2d 647 (App. Div. 1960)
(presentence report in parole file erroneously stated, inter alia, that prisoner had violent
tendencies).
13. See, e.g., Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (en banc), aff'g in
part and rev'g in part 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978); Williams
v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143, 1158-60 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977); Holup v. Gates,
544 F.2d 82, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 941 (1977); Cook v. Whiteside, 505 F.2d
32, 34 (5th Cir. 1974).
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prisoner has a protectable interest in his release hearing so as to warrant the
protection of procedural due process. 14 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has
not addressed this problem and lower courts have reached conflicting re-
suits. 15 Even courts holding that due process does apply to the hearing have
decided that such application does not require that a prisoner be provided
with access to his prison file prior to the hearing. 16 These latter decisions have
14. A prisoner may claim the protection of the due process clause. Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91 (1945). A person cannot be denied access to the courts simply because he is a
prisoner. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971), aff'g Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105
(N.D. Cal. 1970); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941). Although "[l]awful imprisonment
necessarily makes unavailable many [of the] rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen, ... a
prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime."
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974); cf. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (prisoners
enjoy religious freedom under the first amendment); Lee v. Washington, 263 F. Supp. 327 (1966),
aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (prisoner protected by equal protection clause from mcal
discrimination).
15. The Fifth Circuit has consistently held that due process is not applicable to the parole
release hearing. Cruz v. Skelton, 543 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977);
Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 917 (1976); Cook v.
Whiteside, 505 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1974); Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (Sth
Cir.) (en banc), vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 414 U.S. 809 (1973); accord, Scott v.
Kentucky Parole Bd., No. 74-1899 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1975), vacated and remanded to consider
mootness, 429 U.S. 60 (1976).
A majority of courts, however, have held to the contrary. Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784
(4th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part per curiam on rehearing en bane, 569 F.2d 800 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978); Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977); Holup v. Gates, 544 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1976), eerl. denied, 430
U.S. 941 (1977); United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 914 (1976); Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975); Bradford v.
Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated as moot per curiam, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); Childs
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Johnson v.
Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan
v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974); Cicero v. Olgiati, 410 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Soloway
v. Weger, 389 F. Supp. 409 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Cooley v. Sigler, 381 F. Supp. 441 (D. Minn. 1974);
Johnson v. Heggie, 362 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1973); United States ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, 357
F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Justice Stevens, dissenting from the remand in Scott v. Kentucky Parole Bd., 429 U.S. 60
(1976), noted the importance of this issue as demonstrated by (1) the vast number of parole release
decisions made every year, (2) the importance of each decision to the person affected by it, and (3)
the extreme amount of litigation with varying results in the federal courts. Id. at 61 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
16. Access to parole files has been denied in the following cases: Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d
800 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (en banc), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978); Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977). In the federal system, prior to the adoption of procedures
allowing prisoners to see their files, see note 11 supra, it was usually held that a federal prisoner
had no right to access. See Fisher v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 241 (D. Conn. 1974); Wiley v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 380 F. Supp. 1194 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Barradale v. United States Bd.
of Paroles & Pardons, 362 F. Supp. 338 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
Usually, due process has been held to require only that a prisoner be given a written statement
of reasons for denial of parole. See Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
(en banc), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003
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reasoned that the administrative burden on the state in providing access
outweighs the potential benefits of access to the prisoner)17
In contrast to this judicial approach, this Note will contend that a prisoner
should be permitted to inspect his file if it is to be considered by the parole
board in deciding whether to grant parole. After a preliminary review of the
parole release hearing in Part I, Part II will consider the threshold question of
whether due process applies to the release hearing and conclude that it
should. Part I will then examine the benefits and burdens of prisoner access
and demonstrate that due process requires a right of inspection in order to
avoid arbitrary and capricious denials of parole.
I. THE ROLE OF THE PRISONER'S FILE IN THE RELEASE HEARING
The primary purposes of parole are twofold: First, to help the prisoner
reintegrate into society as soon as he is able, without being confined for the
full term of his sentence; and second, to alleviate the cost of maintaining an
individual in prison.18 The determination of who should be granted parole
and under what conditions is the function of the state board of parole.' 9
Typically, the statutory guidelines set forth to aid the board are extremely
broad. A majority of state statutes are modeled after the Standard Probation
and Parole Act of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, under
which a parole board may grant parole if there is a "reasonable probability
that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the community or to
himself".20
The parole board's decision whether to grant or deny parole is usually made
immediately after a parole release hearing. 21 The board's first decision in
(1978); Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977); United
States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975); Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540
(2d Cir. 1975); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United
States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated
as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974); Soloway v. Weger, 389 F. Supp. 409
(M.D. Pa. 1974); Johnson v. Heggie, 362 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1973).
17. See Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 800, 801 (4th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (en banc), affg in
part and rev'g in part 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978); Williams
v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1158-60 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977).
18. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1972).
19. See generally G. Killinger, H. Kerper & P. Cromwell, Probation and Parole in the
Criminal Justice System 210 (1976).
20. National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Standard Probation and Parole Act § 18
(1955), reprinted in ABA Compendium of Correctional Legislation and Standards 111-37 (1972),
discussed in Note, Curbing Abuse in the Decision to Grant or Deny Parole, 8 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 419, 428 (1973). The New York statute provides that the board must find that "there is
reasonable probability that, if such prisoner is released, he will live and remain at liberty without
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society." N.Y.
Correc. Law § 213 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978).
21. Only Georgia and Texas usually do not afford a prisoner a hearing when determining
whether to grant or deny parole. V. O'Leary & K. Hanmahan, Parole Systems in the United States
31 (3d ed. 1976). In New York, the hearing is conducted by a three member panel of the parole
board. A unanimous vote is required for parole to be granted. N.Y. Correc. Law § 214
(McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1977-1978).
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many states, however, is whether to have a hearing at all. This decision is
made after examination of the prisoner's files without any personal contact
with the prisoner. 22 The file includes, among other items, the prisoner's
presentence report, his physical, medical, and psychiatric reports, his criminal
records, and a disciplinary report containing all infractions of prison rules. 23
A prisoner's file assumes an even greater significance at the hearing itself.
As a result of the large number of prisoners processed by the parole system, 24
the hearing is extremely brief 2s and thus often only a meaningless gesture by
the parole board. 26 In New York, for example, two of the three board
members are generally preoccupied in preparation for subsequent hearings,
and usually just acquiesce in the recommendation of the one board member
who has read the file of the prisoner under consideration. 27 In addition, if
there is any questioning at all, it is usually superficial. 28 Thus, the informa-
tion in the prison file may have more of an impact upon the parole board and
its ultimate decision than the inmate himself. 29
The prisoner may also have an interest in reviewing his file after the
hearing. If parole has been denied the prisoner may seek a reconsideration
only if the board's decision was "flagrant, unwarranted or unauthorized, '30 or
22. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-22-25 (1975); Ga. Code Ann. § 77-516 (1973); Ky. Rev. Stat. §
439.340 (Supp. 1976).
23. See, e.g., statutes cited note 22 supra. The file may also contain "the extent to which the
prisoner has responded to efforts made to improve his mental and moral condition; his then
attitude toward society, the judge who sentenced him, the district attorney who prosecuted him,
and the policeman who arrested him; and his attitude toward his crime and his previous criminal
career. The Board is also required to have before it a report from the superintendent of prison
industries giving the prisoner's industrial record in prison, and a recommendation as to the kind
of work he is best fitted to perform and at which he is most likely to succeed." Menechino v.
Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 405 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971).
24. In New York, the parole board reviews 40 to 50 individuals in one day. United States ex
rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 932 (2d Cir.), vacated as
moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974). Over 30 states equal or exceed the 15
hearings per day recommended by the American Correctional Association and the National
Advisory Commission. V. O'Leary & K. Hanrahan, supra note 21, at 35.
25. In 1972, the average hearing in New York was 5.9 minutes. Attica Report, supra note 4,
at 96. In 1973, the average hearing nationwide was just under 10 minutes. H. Burns, Corrections
293 (1975).
26. See Corrections, supra note 4, at 422-23. A prisoner does not have a due process right to
be represented by counsel at the parole hearing. See, e.g., Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971). Approximately 21 jurisdictions permit
representation by counsel at a hearing. Indigent defendants, however, are rarely represented as
only six jurisdictions provide counsel for them. V. O'Leary & K. Hanrahan, supra note 21, at 39.
A prisoner also does not have a due process right to call witnesses or produce favorable evidence
at such hearings. See, e.g., Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1023 (1971). Approximately 19 jurisdictions permit a prisoner to call witnesses. V. O'Leary
& K. Hanrahan, supra note 21, at 39.
27. See Attica Report, supra note 4, at 96-97,
28. Id. at 96.
29. See H. Burns, supra note 25, at 295.
30. Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir.) (en banc), vacated and
remanded to consider mootness, 414 U.S. 809 (1973).
[Vol. 47
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if the board failed to comply substantially with its own guidelines. 3 1 The right
to reconsideration is more apparent than real, however, because the prisoner,
unaware of the information contained in his file, is in a poor position to
contest the board's decision. 32
Thus, at all stages of the parole release heaing-before, during, and after-a
prisoner has a vital interest in inspecting the information in his file. If this
information is misleading or inaccurate, the prisoner may be denied parole.
Providing a prisoner with access to his file enables him to expose or rebut
inaccurate information, 33 which may otherwise have contributed to an unfair
denial of parole. As a result, many prisoners have alleged that due process
entitles them to a right of inspection. 34 Before considering which procedural
safeguards to implement at parole release hearings, however, it must first be
determined whether the prisoner has a protectable interest in the hearing so as
to warrant the protection of the due process clause. 35
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF DUE PROCESS TO THE PAROLE RELEASE
HEARING
A. Due Process Application
For many years due process was not considered applicable to either the
process of granting parole36 or the process of revoking a prisoner's parole
already granted. 37 The prevalent view was that parole was a privilege
extended by the state38 and, as such, was outside the ambit of due process
protection. 39 These decisions were consistent with the concept that the
protection of the due process clause turned upon whether a governmental
31. Wagner v. Gilligan, 425 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Mfasiello v. Norton, 364
F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (D. Conn. 1973).
32. Although the prisoner must be informed of the reasons for the board's decision, N.Y.
Correc. Law § 214(b) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978), this information is of little help to the
prisoner who seeks to challenge the board's decision. See notes 94-96 infra and accompanying
text.
33. See pt- II(B)(1), (2) infra.
34. See cases cited note 16 supra.
35. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly,397 U.S. 254
(1970).
36. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971). In
Menechino, the prisoner argued that a denial of his application for parole was unconstitutional
because he had not been afforded certain procedural rights, including notice of the information to
be considered by the board in determining his parole. The court rejected his contentions and
stated two reasons why due process did not apply to a parole release heaing- First, the parole
board's interest in the proceeding was not adverse to that of the prisoner, primarily because it is
the board's interest to encourage and foster the prisoner's rehabilitation and readjustment into
society, and second, the prisoner did not presently enjoy a protectable interest in the liberty of
parole, since parole is a privilege extended by the state. Id. at 407-08.
37. See, e.g., Mead v. California Adult Auth., 415 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1969); Rose v. Haskins,
388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Hodge v. Markley, 339 F.2d 973 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 927 (1965); Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964).
38. E.g., Brown v. Kearney, 355 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1966).
39. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407-08 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023
(1971).
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benefit was characterized as a "right" or a "privilege". 40 Therefore, since
parole was considered an "act of grace '4 1 of the state, the state parole board
could grant, revoke, or deny parole as it saw fit.
The right-privilege analysis, however, has been rejected by the Supreme
Court.4 2 An individual seeking to avail himself of due process protections
must now establish that a liberty or property interest encompassed by the
fourteenth amendment is involved. 43 Applying this standard, the Court, in
Morrissey v. Brewer,44 held that due process does apply to a parole revoca-
tion hearing. The Court, however, has yet to address the question of whether
the prospect of liberty involved in a parole release hearing qualifies as a
protectable interest. It is suggested that an inmate may establish a protectable
interest in a release hearing by application of either one of two theories. The
first theory centers upon the "conditional liberty" offered by parole, a
concept first introduced in Morrissey.45 The second theory originates from
those state statutes that mandate that an inmate must be considered for
parole after completion of a specified portion of his sentence. 46
B. Conditional Liberty
In Morrissey, two prisoners had their parole revoked for violating the
conditions of their parole, without being afforded a hearing. 47 The Court,
distinguishing parole revocation from a criminal prosecution, rejected the
prisoners' argument that they should be extended the full panoply of pro-
cedural rights.48 Nevertheless, the Court found that the parolees had an
interest in maintaining their "conditional liberty" which had been granted by
the parole board. 49
The Court stated that each "parolee has relied on at least an implicit
promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole
conditions," and reasoned that "the liberty of a parolee, although indetermi-
nate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termina-
tion inflicts a 'grievous loss' . . . .- 0 Thus, the Court concluded that the
40. See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935); Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 (1908).
41. Arketa v. Wilson, 373 F.2d 582, 585 (9th Cir. 1967).
42. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968).
43. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (19713; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262
(1970); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
44. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
45. See pt. I(B) infra.
46. See pt. H1(C) infra.
47. 408 U.S. at 472-74.
48. Id. at 480.
49. Id. at 482-84.
50. Id. at 482. The idea of an implied promise as the ;ource of a protected interest is not new.
In Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971), a public school teacher was dismissed from his
job for failing to take a loyalty oath. The Court held that he was deprived of due process despite
the fact that he was hired without tenure or a formal contract, because he was hired "with a
[Vol. 47
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parolees were entitled to due process protection at their parole revocation
hearing.51
The Fifth Circuit has declined to extend Morrissey to parole release
hearings, reasoning that, in essence, there is no identity of interest between a
parolee at a revocation hearing who faces termination of freedom presently
enjoyed and a prisoner at a release hearing who has only the mere prospect of
freedom.5 2 The majority of courts, however, have properly rejected this
narrow distinction, and have extended the Morrissey concept of conditional
liberty to release hearings. These courts have reasoned that just as the parolee
at a revocation hearing has an interest in maintaining his conditional liberty,
the prisoner at the release hearing has an interest in achieving this same
conditional liberty.5 3 "To hold otherwise would be to create a distinction too
gossamer-thin to stand close analysis. Whether the immediate issue be release
or revocation, the stakes are the same: conditional freedom versus incarcera-
tion."
5 4
dearly implied promise of continued employment." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972) (construing Connell).
51. The due process requirements mandated by Morrissey were: (1) written notice of the
claimed parole violations; (2) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (3) the opportunity
to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (5) a neutral and detached hearing body such as a
traditional parole board; and (6) a written statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied
upon and the reasons for revoking parole. 408 U.S. at 489.
52. Cruz v. Skelton, 543 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977); Brown v.
Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 917 (1976); Cook v. Whiteside, 505
F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1974); Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 414 U.S. 809 (1973).
In Brown, the court viewed parole as a privilege and reasoned that if the prisoner were denied
parole, no "grievious loss" would occur. 528 F.2d at 1052-53. This analytical approach is
misplaced in light of Morrissey's clear language that whether a prisoner had a due process right in
parole did not turn upon whether parole was considered a privilege. 408 U.S. at 481-82.
53. A number of cases which have extended due process to the release hearing have relied
upon Morrissey. See Williams v. Ward, 566 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944
(1977); United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 914 (1976); Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975); Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d
728 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated as moot per curiam, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); Childs v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States ex re. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y.
State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419
U.S. 1015 (1974); Cicero v. Olgiati, 410 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Johnson v. Heggie, 362
F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1973). Other courts extending due process to the release hearing have
relied upon Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), discussed at pL 11(C) infra, as the source of
due process protection at the hearing. Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977), qff'd in
part and rev'd in part per curiam on rehearing en bane, 569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1003 (1978); Soloway v. Weger, 389 F. Supp. 409 (MD. Pa. 1974). These decisions,
however, typically fail to define adequately the interest of the prisoner at the release hearing. It is,
therefore, unclear what procedures would best protect the prisoner's interest.
54. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925, 928
(2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974). The Johnson court,
citing the large number of prisoners released on parole each year, stated that "the average
prisoner, having a better than 50% chance of being granted parole before the expiration of his
maximum sentence, has a substantial 'interest' in the outcome." Id.; accord, Bradford v.
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The second element present in Morrissey, an implied promise by the
state," s would also seem to be present in the release hearing context. In
Morrissey, the implied promise was that the parolee, as long as he fulfilled the
conditions of parole, would not be subjected to arbitrary and capricious
actions by the state regarding his parole status.3 6 In a release hearing, the
implied promise is that an individual considered for parole, will be given a
fair hearing. Thus, due process requires only that the parole board set up
procedures which fairly determine, in light of all available information,
whether parole should be granted. 57 Providing a prisoner with the right to
inspect his files is an essential step in achieving such a fair determination. 8
C. Statutory Due Process Right
State statutes governing the parole process provide another basis for
concluding that due process is applicable to a parole release hearing. The
Fourth Circuit recently relied upon this approach in Franklin v. Shields. 9
There, two prisoners were denied access to their files which were later used by
the Virginia Probation and Parole Board in its decision to deny them parole.6 0
They challenged the procedures employed by the board alleging, inter alia,
that the board's denial of access to the files constituted a denial of procedural
due process. 6' The district court held that due process required that a prisoner
eligible for parole be afforded access to his files at a reasonable time prior to
Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated as moot per curiam, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); Childs
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
In Johnson, the Second Circuit ultimately decided that the fourteenth amendment required that
a prisoner must be given a written statement of the rea;ons for denial of his parole. 500 F.2d at
934. The court, however, was careful not to overrule its previous holding in Menechino v. Oswald,
430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971), discussed at note 36 supra. It
interpreted Menechino to hold simply that not all procedural due process rights attach to a release
hearing. Thus, Menechino, it said, permitted an individual approach to procedures requested at a
parole hearing. 500 F.2d at 926-28.
55. See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
56. 408 U.S. at 484.
57. This would be totally consistent with Morrissey: "What is needed is an informal hearing
structured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that
the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee's behavior."
Id. at 484.
It is suggested that a fair parole release hearing could he achieved by application of the second,
third, and sixth of the Morrissey procedures. See note 51 supra. Application of the second and
third procedures, which provided that the parolee must be informed of the evidence against him
before his hearing and that he had a right to be heard in person concerning the evidence, could
best be effected by giving a prisoner access to his file. This would also allow a prisoner to prepare
for his hearing and to make an affirmative case for parole at the hearing. Application of the sixth
procedure, which provided that the parolee must be given a written statement explaining the
basis of the board's actions, would be consistent with the prisoner's right to be given a statement
of the reasons why parole was denied. See note 54 supra.
58. See pt. III infra.
59. 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part per curiam on rehearing en
banc, 569 F.2d 800, 801 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
60. Id. at 787.
61. Id.
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his parole hearing.62 The court, however, failed to specify the source of the
prisoner's interest that triggered the application of due process. 63
The Fourth Circuit's affirmance provided the missing source.64 The court
found that a liberty interest was created by the statute which established a
right to be considered for parole after completion of a specified portion of the
prison sentence. 65 Thus, instead of a broad ruling that due process is
applicable whenever a prisoner is considered for parole, the court held that
due process applies only when the prisoner's consideration for parole is
mandated by statute. 66
In support of the statutory right approach the Franklin court relied on
Wolff v. McDonnell. 67 There, the Supreme Court held that statutorily created
good-time credits, which shortened the amount of time a prisoner had to serve
before he became eligible for parole, could not be revoked without a hear-
ing.6 8 Wolff turned not on any inherent right of the prisoner to the good-time
credits but rather on the inability of the state to revoke unilaterally the
good-time credit-a concept which the state had created-without some kind of
fair proceeding. 69
62. 399 F. Supp. 309, 316-17 (W.D. Va. 1975). The district court also held that due process
required that the board publish standards and criteria for granting parole, that each prisoner
being considered for parole have a personal hearing before the board, and that a written
statement of reasons be given by the board when denying a prisoner parole. Id. at 313-318.
63. The district court relied on Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated
as moot per curiam, 423 U.S. 147 (1975), in which the Fourth Circuit had held that due process
did apply to a parole release hearing but remanded for consideration of the extent of procedures
required at the hearing. Commentators have stated that Weinstein stands for the proposition that
due process attaches by reason of the "conditional liberty" of parole. See Note, The Applicability
of Due Process and State Freedom of Information Acts to Parole Release Hearings, 27 Syracuse
L. Rev. 1011, 1020 (1976). In light of the court's discussion of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974), discussed at notes 67-69 infra and accompanying text. However, Weinstein would also
seem to support the idea that a due process right attaches by virtue of the state parole statute.
64. Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977). The court had consolidated Franklin
with Williams v. Virginia Probation & Parole Bd., 401 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D. Va. 1975), which in
reliance on the district court decision in Franklin, had required that a prisoner be given access to
his file.
65. "The prisoner's interest in these proceedings is the present right to be considered for
parole, a right created by Virginia law." 569 F.2d at 788. The Virginia statute provided, with
certain exceptions, that prisoners were eligible for parole after serving one-fourth of their term or
twelve years of their sentence, whichever was less. Va. Code § 53-251 (Supp. 1976).
66. On rehearing en banc, however, the Fourth Circuit reversed its holding that due process
required that a prisoner be given access to his files. The court, without referring to the statutory
right theory, affirmed that part of the decision which had held that due process did apply to the
release hearing. Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1978), (per curiam) (en banc), aff'g in
part and rev'g in part, 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
67. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
68. Id. at 557-58. In Wof, the credits had been revoked for alleged disciplinary violations.
Id. at 555. These good-time credits which were given to a prisoner for good behavior could be
revoked, without a hearing, for serious disciplinary violations. Id. at 547-53.
69. The Woff Court, however, did not afford the prisoner a full range of procedural
safeguards. The Court held that- (1) a prisoner has no constitutional right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses at prison disciplinary proceedings, such procedures being
discretionary with the prison officials, id. at 567-69; and (2) the prisoner has no right to retained
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The Franklin court would seem to be correct in extending the Wolff
reasoning to the parole release hearing. A prisoner has no right to either
good-time credits or parole. Both are created by state law, however, and both
affect a prisoner's liberty. As such, both involve a protectable interest that the
state cannot arbitrarily revoke or withhold.
Although the Supreme Court has recently rejected due process claims by
prisoners alleging a statutory right theory, these decisions do not affect the
application of the theory at a parole release hearing. In both Meachum v.
Fano70 and Montanye v. Haymes, 71 prisoners alleged that absent an adequate
fact finding hearing, they had an interest in remaining in their present
correctional facility, rather than being transferred to one where the conditions
were less favorable. 72 The prisoners were transferred to maximum security
prisons on the basis of the prison officials' belief that they were engaging in
conduct detrimental to maintenance of prison discipline. 73
In both cases the court held that neither prisoner could show a protectable
interest because, unlike Wolff, the statutes involved created no expectation
that the prisoner was entitled to serve his sentence at one correctional
institution rather than another. 74 This reasoning is inapplicable to parole
release hearings. Those statutes that form the basis of the statutory right
theory typically mandate that a prisoner be considered for parole after serving
a specified portion of his sentence. 75 Unlike the prisoners in Meachum and
Montanye, who did not have a statutory right to serve their sentence in one
particular institution, prisoners governed by these parole statutes have a
statutory right to be considered for parole. 76
The statutory right theory, however, is of limited use. First, not all states
or appointed counsel in such proceedings, although counsel substitutes should be provided In
certain cases. Id. at 569-70. The Court held that due process required only that the prisoner be
provided: (1) advance written notice of the charges no less than 24 hours before his appearance,
id. at 563-64; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence In his
defense if permitting him to do so would not jeopardize institutional safety or correctional goals,
id. at 566-67; and (3) a written statement as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the
disciplinary action. Id. at 565.
In limiting the extent of due process, Wolff attempted to balance the prisoner's needs against
the prison administration's desires to maintain proper disciplinary proceedings by ensuring "swift
and sure" punishment for those who have broken the rules. Id. at 572. This Interest in proper
disciplinary proceedings, however, should not be used to restrict the extent of due process In a
parole release hearing. There, "the purpose of the proceeding is not to determine punishment;
rather it is to determine if the prisoner has been rehabilitated enough as to be conditionally
released back into society." Rosenthal, Due Process for Prisoners Facing Parole Boards, 21 Am.
Trial Law. A. L. Rep. 213 (1978).
70. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
71. 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
72. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. at 242; Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 224.
73. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. at 237-39; Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 216-21.
74. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. at 243 (construing N.Y. Correc. Law § 23(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1975-1976)), Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 226-27 (construing Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 127,
§ 97 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1972)).
75. See note 7 supra.
76. For a list of states where a prisoner must be considered for parole after serving a specified
portion of his sentence, see note 7 supra.
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provide that a prisoner will be considered for parole after a specified period of
time.7 7 For example, in Alabama and Connecticut, the determination of
whether an individual should be considered for parole is made by the board
itself after reviewing the prisoner's files. 78 Thus, a prisoner in these states
would be unable to establish a statutory right to a fair parole hearing. In
addition, the statutory right theory may provide only limited due process
protection. Because the theory emphasizes a state-created right, it can be
argued that the state legislature did not intend to burden the state with a
series of expensive and cumbersome procedures. 79 The conditional liberty
theory, on the other hand, is a broader approach in that it emphasizes the
prisoner's right to a fair hearing. It offers a prisoner seeking access to his file a
better chance of success than the statutory right theory because it applies
whether or not the prisoner's consideration for parole is mandated by statute.
I-. COMPETING INTERESTS: BURDEN VERSUS BENEFITS
A. Burden Upon the State
The mere application of due process to the release hearing, of itself, does
not guarantee a prisoner the right to inspect his file. Determination of the
specific procedures which are engendered by due process requires a court to
balance the private interest affected against the government's interest in
avoiding burdensome administrative procedures."0 In the case of access to
parole files, the courts have typically denied prisoner's requests. 81 Invariably,
the courts have concentrated their analysis on the burden placed upon the
state by having to provide access, without adequately considering the possible
benefits to be gained by providing access.82
Williams v. Ward8 3 is a classic example of the judicial emphasis on
administrative convenience. In Williams, the court held that due process does
not mandate that a prisoner be granted access to his files, absent a showing
that access is necessary to ensure that the board relies on neither an impermis-
sible factor nor false information contained in the files.84 This standard,
77. For a list of states where consideration for parole is at the discretion of the board, see note
7 supra.
78. Ala. Code § 15-22-15 (1975); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-125 (West Supp. 1978).
79. In the Fourth Circuit's first consideration of Franklin, 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977),
discussed at notes 59-66 supra and accompanying text, Judge Field was opposed to granting
access to prison files because it would place a burden upon the state which was not outweighed by
the potential benefits inuring to the inmate if he were permitted to inspect his file. Id. at 798-800
(Field, J., dissenting). On rehearing, Judge Field's position was adopted by the Fourth Circuit.
569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
80. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 263 (1970); Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728, 733 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated as moot per
curiam, 423 U.S. 147 (1975).
81. See cases cited note 16 supra.
82. See, e.g., Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir.) (access would serve little benefit to
prisoner who knows of adverse information contained therein), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944
(1977); Holup v. Gates, 544 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1976) (no evidence that access will have a positive
impact on the release hearing), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 941 (1977).
83. 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 944 (1977).
84. Id. at 1160-61.
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however, is somewhat illusory because the prisoner who has never seen his
parole file is in a poor position to challenge the accuracy of the information
therein. 8s The Williams court went on to suggest, in dictum, that even if a
proper showing were made, access might be denied because of the burden
placed upon the state if it were forced to provide large numbers of prisoners
with copies of their files.8 6
This, however, was the same fear expressed on the federal level87 before
the United States Parole Commission permitted federal prisoners to inspect
their files before their release hearing.88 To a large extent, this fear has proved
unfounded. 89 The adoption of effective administrative procedures would
lessen, to a great extent, the burden attendant upon providing prisoner
access. 90
B. Benefits of Access
1. Exposure of Inaccurate Information
As a result of the large number of prisoners processed by a parole board
and the various types of information contained in a prisoner's file, 92 the file
may contain erroneous information. 93 Allowing a prisoner to inspect his files
85. Id. at 1160. The plaintiff in Williams, after having been denied parole, sought the
discovery of certain adverse information contained in his parole file and an opportunity to rebut
the evidence at a new release hearing. The information concerned the plaintiff's mental condition
and stemmed, in part, from two threatening letters that the plaintiff had' written to the judge who
had sentenced him. Id. at 1145. The court held that the plaintiff could show no prejudice In
having been denied his file since he already knew the existence of this adverse information. Id. at
1161.
86. Id. at 1160.
87. See note 16 supra.
88. See note 11 supra.
89. Interview with Anthony Cappizzi, Supervisor, United States Probation and Parole Office
for the Eastern District of New York (Oct. 18, 1978); Interview with Harry G. Sydor, Deputy
Chief, United States Probation and Parole Office for the Southern District of New York (Oct. 18,
1978).
90. For example, under the federal system a copy of the prisoner's file is kept at both the
institution where the prisoner is incarcerated and the parole board within the district where the
defendant was sentenced. Approximately 45 days before his scheduled parole hearing a prisoner
may make a request to see his files. The parole board will then make the determination whether
to grant access, and if access is granted, what if anything will be kept from the prisoner to protect
the safety of both the individual prisoner and those who have contributed to the information
contained in the file. However, any item denied the prisoner is in turn kept from the parole board
at the prisoner's hearing.
If access is granted, and in almost all cases it is, the prisoner will be allowed to inspect his file
in the presence of a prison official 30 days before his hearing. The prisoner may take notes but lie
is not permitted to make a copy and will not be given access to his files again prior to his parole
hearing. The prisoner usually spends, on the average, 45 minutes with his file. Interview with
Anthony Cappizzi, Supervisor, United States Probation and Parole Office for the Eastern District
of New York (Oct. 18, 1978); Interview with Harry G. Sydor, Deputy Chief, United States
Probation and Parole Office for the Southern District of New York (Oct. 18, 1978).
91. See note 24 supra.
92. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
93. See cases cited note 12 supra.
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and thereby expose any inaccuracies would ensure that the board does not
consider erroneous information in deciding whether to grant or deny parole.
Nevertheless, courts have held that due process requires only that the parole
board provide the prisoner with a written statement of the reasons underlying
its decision to deny parole. 94 In so doing, courts have, in effect, stated that a
protectable interest worthy of procedural safeguards does not arise until after
parole has been denied. This has been aptly described as "locking the barn
door after the horse is stolen". 9s
This ex post facto protection is cold comfort to a prisoner denied parole
who has lost his chance to expose inaccuracies in his parole files, and who
therefore must wait in prison pending an appeal or reconsideration of his
case.96 Moreover, because the board's written statement of the reasons for
denial of parole may not refer to the false information, the prisoner may never
have a chance to appeal the board's decision. Consequently, because most
states do not have a procedure to ensure that the material contained in parole
files is accurate, 97 the prisoner is best equipped to discover inaccurate
information9" and minimize its prejudicial impact on the parole board.9 9
2. Opportunity To Rebut
The second benefit of providing access is that it would allow the prisoner
the opportunity to rebut adverse information contained in his files or possibly
to explain this information to the parole board. Although parole is considered
a nonadversarial proceeding'"o because the board determines only whether a
prisoner is capable of reentering society,10 1 parole boards have traditionally
required prisoners to make an affirmative case for parole.' 0 2 Thus, a prisoner
would be severely hampered if he is deprived before the hearing of the
information that will be considered by the board in making its decision.,0 3
94. See note 16 supra.
95. Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 793 (4th Cir. 1977), affd in part and ret'd in part per
curiam on rehearing en banc, 569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
96. See Rosenthal, supra note 69, at 215.
97. See Note, Procedural Due Process in Parole Release Proceedings-Existing Rules,
Recent Court Decisions, and Experience in the Prison, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 341, 362 (1976).
98. "Since the data on which the Board acts is not developed through an open adversary
confrontation, its accuracy cannot be assured unless the prisoner has access to the relevant
information in his file." Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784, 794-95 (4th Cir. 1977) (footnote
omitted) aff'd in part and rev'd in part per curiam on rehearing en banc, 569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
99. "Regardless of the particular concerns of the parole board or factors considered in
selecting inmates for release, a full range of information related to the inmate is required for
decisionmaking. For sound decisionmaking, the information must be accurate as well as
complete." G. Killinger, H. Kerper & P. Cromwell, supra note 19, at 251. See also L. Carney,
supra note 2, at 67-69.
100. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
101. See, e.g., Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 405 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1023 (1971).
102. See Corrections, supra note 4, at 423.
103. This is further compounded by the fact that a prisoner cannot produce favorable
witnesses or cross-examine those who have provided adverse information to the parole board. See
note 26 supra.
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Nevertheless, courts have denied prisoners an opportunity to rebut negative
information. In Williams v. Ward, 104 for example, the prisoner sought access
to his psychiatric file which contained reports stemming from a letter the
prisoner had written to his sentencing judge. 10 The court denied the prisoner
access to his files, reasoning that since the prisoner knew that the psychiatric
files existed it would be of no benefit to him to know their contents.10 6
This analysis, however, overlooks the fact that the prisoner sought access to
his files to rebut the conclusions drawn about his behavior and consequent
eligibility for parole as a result of the letter. Manifestly, a person cannot
adequately refute adverse material simply by knowing it exists; he must also
know what the adverse information is.' 0 7 Providing a prisoner with access to
his files would allow him the opportunity to rebut conclusions that the board
might otherwise draw.
3. Prisoner Perception of Parole
A common complaint of prisoners is that the parole system does not deal
openly and fairly with each prisoner.108 Because the interest of the prisoner in
the outcome of parole is so great, permitting him to inspect his parole file and
to interact with the parole board concerning information therein would
demonstrate to the prisoner that parole operates to release those prisoners
most likely to benefit from release and that decisions regarding parole are not
made arbitrarily. 10 9 This could alleviate some of the prisoner's doubts con-
cerning the parole system.
CONCLUSION
A basic premise of each parole release is that the parolee will not return to
prison. Because of the extreme overcrowding" 0 and often volatile situations
104. 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977), discussed at notes 82-86
supra and accompanying text.
105. Id. at 1145.
106. Id. at 1160-61.
107. Due process has mandated that a party be given access to pertinent files prior to an
administrative hearing. In Escalera v. New York Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970), the court held that denying a tenant access to materials In his
folder, when the entire folder is considered by the Housing Authority in an eviction proceeding,
deprives the tenants of due process. Id. at 862. The court stated: "A hearing at which the tenant
can rebut evidence against him would be of little value if the (Housing Authority's] ultimate
decision can rest on items in the tenant's folder of which he has no knowledge and hence has had
no opportunity to challenge." Id. (citations omitted).
Similarly, in Violi v. Reese, 343 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the court held that a serviceman
seeking discharge as a conscientious objector had a due process right to inspect his entire file and
a right to reply in writing to any adverse evidence contained therein before his file was forwarded
to the Chief of Naval Personnel. Id. at 467-68.
108. "A federal prisoner recently told us that discriminatory granting of paroles is the 'greatest
source of bitterness in the entire system.' " R. Goldfarb & L. Singer, After Conviction 281 (1973).
See also H. Abadinsky, supra note 1, at 177; L. Carney, supra note 2, at 199.
109. See Attica Report, supra note 4, at 97-98.
110. At present the prisons are extended beyond their maximum capacity with overcrowding.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1978, § 1, at 1, col. 1. The purpose of providing prisoners with access is to
ensure that the board reaches informed decisions. Better parole decisions could achieve one of the
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in our nation's prisons, informed parole release decisions are a necessity.
Permitting a prisoner to inspect his parole file will not only result in fair and
nonarbitra-y parole hearings, but will also engender informed release deci-
sions, and thus reduce the rate of recidivism. Moreover, this would not only
serve society's interest in the efficient administration of parole, but also its
interest in the prisoner's return to society to pursue a "normal and useful
life."' 11
John P. McCahey
major purposes of parole: the return of a prisoner to society with the idea that he will not return
to prison. See generally Rosenthal, supra note 69, at 215.
111. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
